Acta Oeconomica 43. (1991)

1991 / 1-2. szám - Tellér Gyula: From Hidden Nationalization to Covert Privatization Lessons from the Past and Present in the Industrial Cooperatives

32 GY. TELLÉR: HIDDEN NATIONALIZATION—COVERT PRIVATIZATION trying to seize power over cooperative property, the most they try to do is to found a trade union25, or not even that. It is precisely for this reason that becoming an economic company or chang­ing into one of the companies cannot, and should not be stopped or hindered—in fact, it should generously be taken notice of. In this transformation,—as we have seen—a social process of strong logic and privatization, pushing forward under the banner of economic efficiency, make their own way. To keep these organizations— despite their substance and interests—in he strait-jacket of the current cooperative form would be a significant misunderstanding of the economic and social processes. Let them change into companies, or else it will be necessary to find those other transitory, semi-cooperative or semi-company forms in which their ownership rela­tions, interests and power relations can find their proper expression. However, these forms or the single form to be crystallized from them must not be considered and called a cooperative. This would conceal their real essence or wrap them into the appearance of some other substance. The “cooperative” name has to be reserved for those organizations which undertake to preserve the internal theoretical limits of the cooperative character. It is my opinion that there are and, more to the point there will be—albeit sporadic—such forms of interest groups as well. However, their clear organization and their appearance as a force has to be waited for. In my opinion, in the tra­ditional cooperatives the denomination of property, and the consequent reinforced proprietary interest, along with the tightening interest of maintaining jobs, might lead to the appearance of these. There are, even currently, some latent groups in­terested in the operation of real cooperatives and in keeping their jobs. These can be found in traditional, mainly small, cooperatives and they will survive as long as the interests of acquiring and operating capital do not take possession of them. The strongest motive, however, for creating true industrial cooperatives in Hungary will be—as it is in most places of the world—the complete unfolding of the market economy and the tense relationship between capital and labour.26 In other words, under such conditions there are always some groups who cannot (e.g. in pe­riods of unemployment) or do not want to remain within the framework of a wage­­workers’ livelihood but cannot or do not wish to become capitalist entrepreneurs either. Their strength in capital is insufficient for personal property but their spirit and their ideas and values make them fit for common action. In my view a cooperative form which has been adequately modernized, yet which upholds the internal boundaries of the cooperative character and, together with these, maintains 35 Currently in the cooperative movements three different trade unions are active. 36 For instance, Claude Vinney proves the interconnection between the periods of economic depression and the numerical upswing of industrial cooperatives with the aid of long chronological series. (Vinney 1966) Acta Oeconomica 43, 1991

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